

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 VIENNA 04650 01 OF 04 231610Z

42

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2897

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INFO USMISSION NATO

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AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 VIENNA 4650

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: PLENARY SESSION, MAY 22, 1974

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

BEGIN SUMMARY. THE THIRD PLENARY SESSION OF THE CURRENT ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS WAS HELD ON MAY 22, 1974, UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF US REP AMBASSADOR RESOR. STATEMENTS WERE MADE BY UK REP AMBASSADOR ROSE (TEXT IN SEPTTEL) AND GDR REP AMBASSADOR OESER. IN A STATEMENT WHICH STRESSED THROUGHOUT REDUCTIONS BY ALL DIRECT PARTICIPATIONS FROM THE OUTSET, OESER REFERRED TO THE BOTH THE JUNE 1973 MBFR COMMUNIQUE AND THE APRIL 1974 WARSAW PACT COMMUNIQUE, AND ASSERTED THAT THE EASTERN DRAFT AGREEMENT MET THE OBJECTIVES OF THESE TWO COMMUNIQUE. OESER STATED THAT REDUCTIONS BY ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS FROM THE START WOULD GUARANTEE UNDIMINISHED MILITARY

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PAGE 02 VIENNA 04650 01 OF 04 231610Z

CIPANTS FROM THE START WOULD GUARANTEE UNDIMINISHED MILITARY

SECURITY AND "MUTUALITY", WHEREAS THE ALLIED PROGRAM WOULD DO NEITHER. HE ARGUED THAT WESTERN PHASE I REDUCTIONS WOULD ACTUALLY DECREASE THE SECURITY OF THE GDR. OESER CONTINUED THAT THE MAINTENANCE OF STABILITY DEPENDED UPON RETAINING THE EXISTING CORRELATION OF FORCES AT LOWER LEVELS, ASSERTING THAT ANY CHANGE IN THIS CORRELATION COULD HAVE A NEGATIVE EFFECT BEYOND CENTRAL EUROPE. OESER OBSERVED THAT INITIAL REDUCTIONS BY ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD NOT ONLY GUARANTEE THEIR PARTICIPATION TO THE END OF MBFR, IT WOULD ALSO HELP THOSE NATIONS WHOSE FORCES WOULD BE DEMOBILIZED TO PREPARE FOR THE NEXT LARGER-SCALE STAGE OF REDUCTIONS. OESER STATED THAT THE EASTERN PROPOSAL COULD BE REALIZED QUICKLY IF NATO WOULD DEMONSTRATE THE POLITICAL WILL FOR MUTUAL, SYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS. END SUMMARY.

BEGIN TEXT:

1. MR. CHAIRMAN* AT THE START OF THIRD SESSION OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS, THE HEADS OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC AND POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, MY DISTINGUISHED COLLEAGUES KLEIN AND STRULAK, HAVE AGAIN DEPICTED IN A FUNDAMENTAL AND CONVINCING MANNER THE CONSTRUCTIVE ATTITUDE CONCERNING OUR NEGOTIATIONS ON THE PART OF THE SOCIALIST STATES. IN THIS THEY BASE THEMSELVES ON THE COMMUNIQUE OF THE POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE WARSAW PACT STATES, WHICH WAS ADOPTED DURING THE RECESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. ON BEHALF OF THE GDR DELEGATION, I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE HERE OUR SERIOUS INTENT TO CONTRIBUTE IN THE SENSE OF AN AGREED POLICY OF THE SOCIALIST STATES TO THE PRACTICAL RESULTS OF MILITARY DETENTE, WHICH SUPPLEMENT POLITICAL DETENTE.

2. WE WANT TO STRESS THAT THE USEFUL LAST WORKING PHASE HAS MADE IT EVEN MORE CLEAR HOW MUCH IMPORTANCE IS TO BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE POSITIVE RESULTS OF THE PREPARATORY CONSULTATIONS, WHICH HAVE CREATED A BASIS ARRIVED AT IN PATIENT CONFERENCE WORK, FOR OUR CURRENT SEARCH FOR A CONCRETE AGREEMENT.

3. CAREFUL ANALYSIS OF OUR DISCUSSIONS UP TO NOW SHOWS THAT THE COMMUNIQUE OF JUNE, 1973 REPRESENTS A SIGNIFICANT COMMON BASIS FOR OUR NEGOTIATIONS; IT WAS AGREED TO BY ALL PARTICIPANTS.
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PAGE 03 VIENNA 04650 01 OF 04 231610Z

PATING STATES - BASED ON EXPERIENCES GATHERED AT OTHER SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS ON PROBLEMS OF ARMS LIMITATIONS AND DISARMAMENT - AND IS IN THE INTERESTS OF EACH. IT SHOWS US THE WAY TO PRODUCTIVE WORK.

4. THE LAST SESSION CONFIRMED THAT THE DRAFT TREATY PROPOSAL TABLED BY MY DISTINGUISHED COLLEAGUE KLESTOV IN THE NAME OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE USSR, POLAND, CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE GDR,

DOES CONFORM TO THIS REALISTIC BASIS FOR OUR WORK, AND MAKES
PRECISE APPLICATION OF ITS FUNDAMENTAL ASPECTS. IT HAD BECOME
APPARENT THAT THIS DOCUMENT IS A PLATFORM FOR PRODUCTIVE DIS-
CUSSIONS WHICH TAKES INTO CONSIDERATION THE INTERESTS OF ALL
PARTICIPANTS.

5. THE PROPOSED PHASED REDUCTION ON AN EQUAL PERCENTAGE BASIS
OF THE FORCES AND ARMAMENTS OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPATING
STATES, I.E., OF ALL NATIONAL AND FOREIGN FORCES IN THE AREA
OF REDUCTIONS, GUARANTEES THE FOLLOWING IN LINE WITH THE
COMMUNIQUE OF JUNE 28, 1973:

A. FIRST, THE REALIZATION OF THE BASIC CONCEPT
"THAT CONCRETE AGREEMENTS WOULD IN EVERY RESPECT AND AT
EVERY STAGE CORRESPOND TO THE BASIC CONCEPT OF UNDIMINISHED
SECURITY OF ALL PARTICIPANTS", AND

B. SECOND, THE REALIZATION OF THE MUTUALITY OF THE REDUCTION
OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS BY ALL POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS IN
AN AGREEMENT.

6. BY CONSEQUENTLY HONORING THESE AGREEDHUMES

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PAGE 01 VIENNA 04650 02 OF 04 231601Z

42

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 4 VIENNA 4650

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

PRINCIPLES, AN INTERNATIONALLY BINDING OBLIGATION WOULD BE CARRIED OUT WHICH IS AIMED AT STRENGTHENING PEACE, SECURITY AND STABILITY IN EUROPE BY MAINTAINING THE EXISTING RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS AT A LOWER LEVEL OF FORCES. EVERY CHANGE IN THE RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES IN THIS AREA OF HIGH CONCENTRATION OF ARMED FORCES COULD ALSO INFLUENCE AN AREA EXTENDING BEYOND CENTRAL EUROPE. IT WOULD ALSO IMPAIR THAT GLOBAL BALANCE RECENTLY MENTIONED IN SIGNIFICANT OFFICIAL STATEMENTS MADE IN WESTERN PARTICIPATING STATES.

7. THE DRAFT PROPOSAL OF THE SOCIALIST STATES OFFERS THE BEST BASIS FOR CONFIDENCE FOR EACH
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PAGE 02 VIENNA 04650 02 OF 04 231601Z

INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPANT, SINCE IT UNEQUIVOCALLY SPECIFIES HOW ALL PARTICIPATING STATES WOULD MAKE THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO THE REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN A PARALLEL MANNER, AND STEP-BY-STEP.

8. THE PARTICIPATION OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPATING STATES FROM THE START AND AT EVERY STAGE OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A REDUCTION AGREEMENT IS THE MOST EFFECTIVE, CONFIDENCE-BUILDING GUARANTEE THAT ALL OF US MOVE ALONG TO THE VERY END THE ADMITTEDLY COMPLICATED PATH TO A REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE IN A COLLECTIVELY DEMARCATED AND TEMPORAL FRAMEWORK. THIS WOULD AVOID THE SLOWING DOWN, INTERFERENCE OR UNDERMINING BY THE PARTICIPANTS OF THE PROCESS OF REDUCTIONS. THIS IS SIGNIFICANT BECAUSE, AS ALL OF US HERE KNOW, THE GROUPING OF COMBAT FORCES OF NATO AND OF THE WARSAW PACT IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS ARE VERY DIFFERENTLY COMPOSED AS CONCERNS THEIR NATIONAL AND FOREIGN CONTINGENTS, AND AS FAR AS THOSE ARE CONCERNED THERE IS FURTHERMORE A DIFFERENCE IN THE NUMBER OF TROOP CONTINGENTS AND WEAPONS CATEGORIES, AND OF THE PLACES IN WHICH THEY ARE STATIONED. THEY HAVE FOR DECADES CONSTITUTED A UNIFIED SYSTEM, WHICH WILL HAVE TO BE HANDLED MILITARILY

AS AN ENTITY. THE PHASED PROGRAM OF THE SOCIALIST DRAFT PROPOSAL FURTHERMORE ASSURES THAT THERE WOULD BE A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS OF ALL PARTICIPANTS WHICH WILL TAKE PLACE IN A PRACTICAL MANNER, AND UNINTERRUPTEDLY. THE FIRST STAGE, THE SYMBOLIC REDUCTION, WOULD NOT ONLY DOCUMENT THE POLITICAL WILL OF ALL PARTICIPATING STATES TO SUPPLEMENT AND TO SUPPORT POLITICAL DETENTE THROUGH CONCRETE CONTRIBUTION OF A MILITARY DETENTE; IT WOULD ALSO PERMIT THE GATHERING OF EXPERIENCE STEP-BY-STEP, AND THUS PREPARE FOR THE IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING PHASE OF A FIVE PERCENT REDUCTION. THIS IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT AND USEFUL FOR THOSE STATES WHOSE COMBAT FORCES WOULD HAVE TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS OF DEMOBILIZATION.

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PAGE 03 VIENNA 04650 02 OF 04 231601Z

9. THIS APPROACH MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO REACH IN TWO STAGES, BY 1976, AN ALREADY SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION OF MORE THAN 7 PERCENT OF THE COMBAT FORCES OF EACH PARTICIPANT. THESE WOULD THEN BE FOLLOWED BY A FURTHER REDUCTION OF 10 PERCENT.

10. THE INCLUSION OF GROUND AND AIR FORCES, INCLUSIVE OF UNITS WITH NUCLEAR ARMS IN THE REDUCTION, AS ENVISAGED IN THE SOCIALIST PROPOSAL, TAKES COGNIZANCE OF THEIR COMPLEX INTERACTION, THEIR DIFFERENT COMBAT POTENTIAL AND PERSONNEL STRENGTH, AS WELL AS OF THEIR DIFFERENT STRUCTURES. THAT IS THE NECESSARY BASIS FOR SELECTING IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS COMPARABLE UNITS WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE WEAPONS SYSTEMS WHICH ARE TO BE REDUCED BY THE DIFFERENT PARTICIPATING STATES.

11. BY INCLUDING ALL COMPONENT FORCES IT IS THUS POSSIBLE TO MAKE THE FACTUALLY JUSTIFIED SELECTION, WHILE TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF ALL. THIS MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO LAY THE GROUND WORK R DECISIONS WHICH ARE SIMPLE AND JUST BECAUSE THEY TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE INTERESTS OF ALL PARTICIPANTS AT EACH STAGE OF THE REDUCTION PROGRAM, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DETERMINATIONS CONTAINED IN THE COMMUNIQUE OF JUNE 28, 1973.

12. THE NEGOTIATION PROGRAM OF THE SOCIALIST STATES CAN BE REALIZED WITHOUT INTERRUPTION, IF ON THE PART OF THE NATO STATES THERE WILL BE THE

POLITICAL DESIRE FOR MUTUAL, I.E., SYMMETRICAL
REDUCTIONS OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS OF ALL PARTICI-
PATING STATES. THAT IS THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING
OFFER OF THE SOCIALIST STATES WHICH LIES ON THIS
NEGOTIATING TABLE. WE THEREFORE EXPECT A
SATISFACTORY RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION:"WHICH
CONTRIBUTION WILL BE MADE BY ALL DIRECT

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PAGE 01 VIENNA 04650 03 OF 04 231608Z

42

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 4 VIENNA 4650

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

PARTICIPANTS IN THE FIRST PHASE OF THE REDUCTION,
WHICH CONTRIBUTION WILL BE MADE IN THE SECOND PHASE,
AND SO FORTH?"

13. IN HIS PRESENTATION ON MAY 10, AMBASSADOR QUARLES HAS
EXPRESSED THE GENERAL DESIRE TO MAKE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS
IN THIS THIRD ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS. WE WELCOME THIS,
AND IT FINDS A POSITIVE ECHO AMONG US.

14. UNFORTUNATELY THERE IS IN HIS PRESENTATION AN EVEN MORE

POINTED REPETITION OF UNREALISTIC POSITIONS. THIS IS EVEN MORE DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND, SINCE THE SOCIALIST STATES HAD JUSTIFIABLY EXPECTED A MORE POSITIVE REACTION FROM THE WESTERN SIDE TO THEIR FAIR PROPOSAL WHICH OFFERS A BROAD LATITUDE FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS.

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PAGE 02 VIENNA 04650 03 OF 04 231608Z

15. IN AMBASSADOR QUARLES' PRESENTATION A FEW BASIC SHORTCOMINGS OF THE WESTERN POSITION BECAME PARTICULARLY NOTICE-ABLE:

A. -- THE AIM OF THE NEGOTIATION, IT IS BEING PROCLAIMED, IS THE REMOVAL OF "DIFFERENCES CONCERNING GROUND FORCES" THROUGH ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS WHICH WILL LEAD TO A COMMON CEILING OF GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL.

B. -- ALL PROPOSALS ARE SELECTED SYSTEMATICALLY IN SUCH A WAY THAT "EACH MAJOR POINT OF THE PROPOSALS CONTRIBUTES DIRECTLY TO THIS AIM".

16. AS ALREADY POINTED OUT, THIS APPROACH IS IN OPEN CONTRADICTION TO THE DOCUMENTS OF 1973 WHICH HAD STIPULATED THAT THERE WOULD BE A MUTUAL REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE AS A SUBJECT FOR NEGOTIATION AND AS A COMPLETE AIM. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THIS APPROACH CONSIST OF FACT THAT

A. -- THERE IS A UNILATERAL DETERMINATION OF A DEVIATING AIM WHICH IS TO SECURE ADVANTAGES FOR THE NATO STATES,

B. -- AT THE SAME TIME THERE IS AN ARBITRARY NARROWING OF THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE NEGOTIATIONS,

C. -- THE "SELECTION" OF THE MAIN POINTS OF THE WESTERN PROPOSALS WAS MADE IN A MANNER WHICH WOULD SERVE THE SELF-SELECTIVE AIM OF OBTAINING UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES.

17. THE WESTERN SIDE IS TRYING WITH THIS PURPOSEFUL CONSTRUCTION TO JUSTIFY THE FACT THAT

A. -- THE ARMED FORCES OF THE FRG, GREAT BRITAIN, BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS, CANADA AND LUXEMBOURG WILL NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE REDUCTION FROM THE START,

B. -- AIR FORCES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNITS ARE BEING EXCLUDED,

C. -- EQUAL MUTUAL REDUCTIONS ARE BEING REJECTED.

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PAGE 03 VIENNA 04650 03 OF 04 231608Z

18. ONE CAN OF COURSE AGREE WITH AMBASSADOR QUARLES THAT THIS WAS NOT AN AWKWARD WAY OF MAKING A SELECTION, BUT RATHER A DIRECT AND TARGETED SORTING OUT OF INTERESTS OF THE NATO STATES. BUT DOESN'T THE WESTERN SIDE THEREFORE ATTEMPT TO MAKE IT SOMEWHAT TOO EASY FOR ITSELF IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS WHICH ARE T
HO MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE RESULTS; HOW
SHOULD THIS APPROACH EVER ELICIT AGREEMENT FROM US?

19. THIS PROPOSAL IS THE RESULT OF SUCH A SELECTIVITY PRINCIPLE: TO WITHDRAW A SOVIET TANK ARMY WITH 1,700 TANKS FROM GDR TERRITORY BUT TO LEAVE UNCHANGED THE NATO GROUPING CONFRONTING US IN THE NORTH OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC, CONSISTING OF FORCES FROM THE FRG, GREAT BRITAIN, BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS AND CANADA, AND TO MAKE INSIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN THE COMBAT POWER OF US ARMED FORCES STATIONED IN THE SOUTH OF THE FRG, BECAUSE IT IS BEING ENVISAGED THAT THEY WOULD MAKE ONLY A LESS EXTENSIVE AND EXCLUSIVELY PERSONNEL REDUCTION WITHOUT REMOVAL TO THE REAR OF COMBAT MATERIEL.

20. IT IS OBVIOUS FOR ALL THAT THIS PROPOSAL IS INTENDED TO REDUCE THE SECURITY OF THE GDR AND OF THE COMMUNITY OF SOCIALIST STATES IN ITS ENTITY. CONCURRENTLY THERE EXIST FOR THE ARMED FORCES OF THE NATO STATES VOLUMINOUS AND COSTLY PROGRAMS FOR REINFORCEMENT, PLANS TO BROADEN THEIR MOBILIZED RESERVES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS AND OTHER SIMILAR MEASURES. DO THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NATO STATES BELIEVE THAT IN VIEW OF THIS OUR TRUST CAN BE STRENGTHENED

A. - WHEN PARTICULARLY SUCH IMPORTANT MILITARY POWERS AS GREAT BRITAIN AND THE FRG WHICH STAND ON THE BORDER OF THE GDR DO NOT WANT TO INCLUDE THEIR FORCES IN A REDUCTION, HUMB

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PAGE 01 VIENNA 04650 04 OF 04 231536Z

42

ACTION ACDA-19

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 4 OF 4 VIENNA 4650

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

B. -- WHEN 75 PCT OF THE NATO FORCES IN THE AREA
OF REDUCTIONS, AND THE AIR FORCES AS WELL AS
UNITS EQUIPPED WITH RESPECTIVE DELIVERY SYSTEMS
FOR ATOMIC WEAPONS, ARE NOT TO BE REDUCED, AND

C. -- WHEN AS A RESULT OF THIS THEIR STRENGTH
WILL NOT BE LIMITED?

21. AS LONG AS THE CHOICE OF PARTICIPANTS, PHASES
AND REDUCTION QUOTAS TAKES PLACE ACCORDING TO A
PRE-PROGRAMMED AIM FOR REACHING UNILATERAL ADVAN-
TAGES FOR NATO, IT IS NOT SURPRISING THAT THIS
PROCEDURE CANNOT BE REGARDED BY US AS A SIMPLIFYING
APPROACH, BUT RATHER AS ONE MAKING THE NEGOTIATIONS
MORE DIFFICULT.

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PAGE 02 VIENNA 04650 04 OF 04 231536Z

22. MR. CHAIRMAN, WE SUPPORT A WORKING TOGETHER
WHICH CREATES TRUST AND CONSTRUCTIVE PROCEDURES
AT THE NEGOTIATIONS.

23. WE SUPPORT THE FACT THAT THE RESULTS OF OUR
NEGOTIATIONS STRENGTHEN MUTUAL TRUST OF ALL
PARTICIPANTS AND, BEYOND THIS, OF ALL EUROPEAN
STATES. WE THEREFORE REFER ANEW TO THE CONSTRUCT-

IVE SOCIALIST PROPOSALS WHICH DO NOT AIM AT ANY
UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES. WE EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT
IN THIS NEGOTIATION PERIOD THERE WILL BE A BASIC
AGREEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS
TAKE PART FROM THE START IN A MUTUAL REDUCTION OF
FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THAT
WOULD GIVE THE NEGOTIATIONS A NEW DECISIVE IMPULSE.
END TEXT.HUMES

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